Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
2001

Conjoined Twins: The Limits of Law at the Limits of Life
George J. Annas

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons

The Ne w E n g l a nd Jo u r n a l o f Me d ic i ne

Legal Issues in Medicine

C ONJOINED T WINS — T HE L IMITS
OF L AW AT THE L IMITS OF L IFE
GEORGE J. ANNAS, J.D., M.P.H.

C

ONJOINED twins have been the subject of
scientific exhibits, medical study, human curiosity, and even entertainment, but until the
year 2000, conjoined twins had never been the subject of a courtroom battle. A unique case that was
the subject of two British court decisions deserves
study.1 The case illustrates the difficulty of applying
legal principles to unprecedented life-and-death decisions involving proposed medical interventions for
children — particularly when parents and physicians
disagree about what should be done.
The conjoined twins who were the subject of the
court decisions are identified by the judges only as
Jodie and Mary. They are the children of Michaelangelo and Rina Attard of the Maltese island of Gozo.
The couple, who are Roman Catholic, came to England for medical care at about five months’ gestation.
The children, who were joined at the pelvis, their
spinal columns on the same axis, with each having two
arms and two legs, were born on August 8, 2000.
The physicians saw no hope that the twins would survive for more than a year if they remained joined.
They believed that if Mary (the weaker of the two and
whose continued survival depended on sharing Jodie’s
circulatory system) was separated from Jodie, Mary
would die, but Jodie would survive and do well. The
parents refused to authorize the separation on the
basis that it was wrong to choose between the lives
of their two innocent children and that it was contrary to their religious beliefs. Physicians have historically honored the wishes of parents in such cases.2
In this case, however, the physicians decided to go to
court for authorization to proceed with the separation over the objections of the parents.
In the United States, the decision of the parents
would have been final unless the physicians or the state
could have persuaded a judge that this was a case of
child neglect.3 In Britain, the law is different: once
a case is placed before a judge, the judge must decide
what the welfare or best interests of the child require
by exercising “an independent and objective judgment.”1 The parents’ wishes are just one piece of evidence to be considered in making this decision. The
trial-court judge concluded that separation was in the
best interests of both children and that separation
was not a case of killing Mary but one of passive euthanasia in which her food and hydration would be

withdrawn (by clamping off her blood supply from
Jodie).1 The parents and the official solicitor, whose
task was to represent Mary, appealed.
Each of the three judges on the appeals panel issued a separate opinion, as is customary in British
courts. Although all the judges agreed with the trialcourt judge that the separation should be performed,
none agreed with the legal reasoning of that judge,
and none of the three judges on the appeals panel fully agreed with one another’s legal reasoning. There
are many explanations for these conflicting opinions,
including the unprecedented nature of the dispute itself, a reliance on analogies that did not quite work,
and a strong desire to authorize physicians to do what
they think is best for their newborn patients.
THE OPINION OF LORD JUSTICE
ALAN WARD

Lord Justice Alan Ward begins his analysis by noting that this “truly is a unique case” that “in a nutshell” involves killing the weaker twin, Mary (who
would not have been viable had she been a singleton), to “give Jodie a life which will be worthwhile.”
Ward describes the physical condition of the twins
in detail, quoting from medical reports that document,
among other things, that Jodie has “an anatomically
normal brain, heart, lungs and liver” and that she “appears to be a bright little girl,” who is expected to be
of “normal intelligence.” Mary, on the other hand, is
described by physicians as “severely abnormal,” having
a “primitive” brain, a very poorly functioning heart,
and the absence of lung tissue. Ward concludes that
Mary is incapable of surviving separately: “She lives on
borrowed time, all of which is borrowed from Jodie.
It is a debt she can never repay.” He notes that separation will cause Mary’s death (which will be quick
and painless) and that a heart–lung transplant is not
an option for Mary.1
Lord Justice Ward then turns to the question of
why the court is involved at all, noting that although
“every instinct of the medical team has been to save
life where it can be saved,” it would have been “perfectly acceptable” for the medical team and hospital
to have respected the parents’ wishes, even though
this would have resulted in the death of both twins.
But seeking the court’s authorization of surgery is
also acceptable in Ward’s view, because “here sincere
professionals could not allay a collective medical conscience and see children in their care die when they
know one was capable of being saved. They could not
proceed in the absence of parental consent. The only
arbiter of that sincerely held difference of opinion is
the court. Deciding disputed matters of life and death
is surely and pre-eminently a matter for a court of
law to judge.”1
In analyzing the existing law, Ward strongly disagrees with the trial court. He states that it is “utterly fanciful” to classify the operation as “an omis-
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sion” of treatment (the failure to continue to provide
nutrition) rather than as an active surgical intervention that will end Mary’s life and that there is no way
that killing Mary can be “in Mary’s best interests.”
Instead, he concludes that the only proper legal path
when there is a conflict of interest between conjoined
twins is “to choose the lesser of two evils.”
Ward condemns the parents’ refusal to choose life
for Jodie in dramatic terms: “In my judgment, parents who are placed on the horns of such a terrible
dilemma simply have to choose the lesser of their inevitable loss. If a family at the gates of a concentration camp were told they might free one of their
children but if no choice were made both would die,
compassionate parents with equal love for their twins
would elect to save the stronger and see the weak one
destined for death pass through the gates.” He goes
on to say, “My heart bleeds for them. But . . . it is
I who must now make the decision.”
The decision, of course, seems to have been made
once the condition of the two twins was described.
But it still must be legally justified. Ward does this
by accusing Mary of killing Jodie and thus making a
decision to kill Mary justifiable homicide, a case of
“quasi self defence”: “Mary may have a right to life,
but she has little right to be alive. She is alive because . . . she [parasitically] sucks the lifeblood out
of Jodie. If Jodie could speak, she would surely protest, ‘Stop it, Mary, you’re killing me.’” Ward concludes that the physicians have a legal duty to Jodie,
which gives them an obligation to act, and that “doctors cannot be denied a right of choice if they are
under a duty to choose.”1
THE OPINION OF LORD JUSTICE
ROBERT BROOKE

Lord Justice Robert Brooke horrified the parents
when, in open court, he looked at pictures of the
twins and asked, “What is this creature in the eyes of
the law?”4,5 His opinion, however, is more analytical.
He agrees with Ward’s analysis of family law but believes more is required to conclude persuasively that
the operation that will kill Mary is lawful. The official solicitor, who opposed the separation, suggested
nonetheless that the court might wish to develop new
law that permitted such an operation if it was “proportionate and necessary” and “approved in advance
by the court.” Brooke essentially adopts this approach,
and much of his opinion explores the legal doctrine
of necessity.
The chief case that he examines is that of Regina
v. Dudley and Stephens, a famous 1884 case that involved shipwreck and survival on the high seas by
means of murder and cannibalism.6 In that case, a
crew of four was sailing the yacht Mignonette from
England to Australia when the ship came apart in a
storm in the South Atlantic Ocean 2000 miles from
land. The crew escaped in a lifeboat with only two

cans of turnips. After 19 days the three senior members of the crew killed 17-year-old Richard Parker,
the youngest and weakest member of the crew, and
ate him in order to survive. They later explained that
the point of killing him before he died naturally was
to be able to drink his blood.7 After being rescued and
returned to England, they were arrested and tried
for murder — a charge they did not deny. Their defense was “necessity.” The British courts rejected this
defense, noting among other things that the boy did
not threaten the rest of the crew and that the law
could not justify the killing of “the weakest, the
youngest, the most unresisting. . . . Was it more
necessary to kill him than one of the grown men?
The answer must be ‘No.’”6
Although so far rejected by British law, as this case
illustrates, Brooke suggests that there may be circumstances in which the necessity defense should be
allowed. He gives several examples. The first is the
case of a mountain climber who must cut the rope
holding him to another climber who has fallen, otherwise both will perish. The next is the 1987 sinking
of the passenger ferry Herald of Free Enterprise near
Zeebrugge, Belgium, in which almost 200 passengers
drowned. An army corporal said that he and dozens
of other people were in the water near the foot of a
rope ladder and all were in danger of drowning. Their
route to safety was blocked by a young man on the
ladder who was paralyzed with fear. Eventually, the
corporal ordered the man to be pushed off the ladder so that the others could climb to safety.
Two other examples had been used in the United
States in 1977 by a rabbinical scholar who counseled
a Jewish couple considering a similar operation on
their conjoined twins who shared a heart.8 The rabbi
reportedly said that if two men jump from a burning
plane and the parachute of the second one fails to
open, and he grabs the legs of the first man, the man
whose parachute did open is morally justified in kicking the second man away to save himself because the
man whose parachute did not open was “designated
for death.” Likewise, if a caravan is surrounded by
bandits, and the bandits demand that a particular person be turned over to them or they will kill everyone,
it is permissible to turn that person over because he
has been “designated for death.”1,8
Many more legal authorities are quoted at length,
but ultimately Lord Justice Brooke concludes that the
objections to the necessity defense presented in the
Dudley case of cannibalism on the high seas — who
can judge this sort of necessity, and how can the comparative value of lives be measured? — are not applicable to the case at hand, because “Mary is, sadly,
self-designated for a very early death.” He also thinks
there is no danger of the misuse of the necessity defense by physicians in other cases of conjoined twins
because “there will be in practically every case the
opportunity for the doctors to place the relevant facts
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before a court for approval (or otherwise) before the
operation is attempted.”1
THE OPINION OF LORD JUSTICE
ROBERT WALKER

Lord Justice Walker opens his opinion by describing this case as “tragic” and “unprecedented anywhere
in the world.” Although conjoined twins are unique,
Walker insists that “there is no longer any place in the
legal textbooks, any more than there is in the medical
textbooks, for expressions (such as ‘monster’) which
are redolent of superstitious horror. Such disparagingly emotive language should never be used to describe a human being, however disabled or dysmorphic.” He nonetheless concludes that continued life
joined to Jodie would “confer no benefit [on Mary]
but would be to her disadvantage.” Walker agrees with
Brooke that the question of whether Mary can be
lawfully killed for Jodie’s sake rests on the issues of
intention and necessity. Like Brooke he uses a series
of analogies, but unlike him, Walker concludes that
“there is no helpful analogy or parallel to . . . this
case.”1
Ultimately, Walker determines that the doctors’
duties to the twins are in conflict. Nonetheless, he
believes the dilemma does not involve choosing “the
relative worth of two human beings” but rather “undertaking surgery without which neither life will have
the bodily integrity (or wholeness) which is its due.”
He believes that having her “bodily integrity,” if only
for a few seconds, is a benefit to Mary. He ultimately
concludes that physicians would separate the twins
not with the intent of killing Mary, but with the intent of making each twin whole and acting in the
best interests of both. What seems to persuade Walker the most, however, is the testimony of the physicians: “Highly skilled and conscientious doctors believe that the best course, in the interests of both
twins, is to undertake elective surgery in order to separate them and save Jodie.”
AFTERMATH

The twins were separated six weeks after the opinion of the Court of Appeal was issued.9 Before the
surgery was performed, there was further debate
over which surgical team — the one with more experience or the one that brought the case to court
— should perform the surgery.10 It was ultimately
performed by the less experienced team. The physicians involved later told the press that they sought
the court’s approval because they were worried about
being prosecuted for the murder of Mary.11 They continued to believe that separation was in the best interests of both twins (although it caused Mary’s
death), and when the final blood vessels connecting
the twins were cut, an act that would result in the
death of Mary, the two lead surgeons said they cut
the blood vessels together, in silence and with “great

respect.”5 The coroner’s verdict stated simply that
Mary died “following surgery separating her from her
conjoined twin, which surgery was permitted by an
order of the High Court, confirmed by the Court of
Appeal.”12
The opinion of the appeals court has been praised.13
Jodie is doing well and may soon go home to Gozo
with her parents.14 She will reportedly require extensive surgery over the next five years, most of which
will be performed in Britain.9 Mary was buried on
Gozo in January.14
PROBLEMS WITH THE LEGAL ANALYSIS

It is easy to see why all the judges involved characterized this case as unique and hoped that it would
not set a precedent. The case seems to have been decided not on the basis of the law (which most of the
judges found of little help) but on an intuitive judgment that the state of being a conjoined twin is a
disease and that separation is the indicated treatment
for it, at least if such treatment affords one of the twins
a chance to live. The judges identified strongly with
the physicians and had little empathy with the parents or their religious beliefs. I think all these factors
led each judge to make problematic legal statements.
Failure to Identify with the Parents

Lord Justice Ward is the hardest on the parents,
using the Sophie’s Choice analogy of a parent at the
gates of a concentration camp. The Nazi physician
in charge of determining who is to go straight to the
gas chambers and who can work or be used in medical experiments tells Sophie that both her children
will be killed if she does not choose one to save.15
Ward insists that a parent in this situation must choose.
Sophie, of course, did choose, although she ultimately lost both children to the Nazis and killed herself
because she was unable to live with her decision.15
Ward’s reasoning, at the heart of his analysis, is troubling in at least two respects. The first is his conclusion that parents must choose which child will die
when only one can be saved. We would not condemn
a parent for making this terrible choice, but neither
should we condemn a parent for refusing to make it.
For example, if a father jumps from a burning plane
holding his two children, one in each arm, and then
begins to lose his grip on both and realizes that he
will drop them both if he does not drop one to save
the other, we would not fault him for dropping one.
Neither, I believe, should we fault a parent for refusing to choose and trying to hang on to both children
for as long as possible. Second, and more disturbing
with respect to the concentration-camp example, is
the question of who the judge thinks is in the role
of the Nazi physician. Ultimately, Ward concludes that
it is the British physicians who “should be given the
right of choice,” but he also seems to place himself
in that role, saying, “it is I who must now make the
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decision.” Of course, Ward is not choosing to kill
both twins, and perhaps he sees nature as the Nazis.
Nonetheless, it is unsettling to have a British judge
rely on what might be termed “concentration-camp
ethics” to reach a decision.
Lord Justice Ward insists that the law requires him
to do what is in the “best interests” of the children
and that British law prohibits the use of the doctrine
of “substituted judgment” (determining what an incompetent person would decide if he or she were capable of making a decision). Nonetheless, his primary
argument turns out to be based on this doctrine: in
colorful language he likens Mary to a parasite who
is “poisoning” Jodie and sucking out her “lifeblood.”
He knows what Jodie would decide if she could decide: “If Jodie could speak, she would surely protest,
‘Stop it, Mary, you’re killing me.’” But the problem
with using substituted judgment in the case of very
young children is that we have no way of knowing
what they would say and tend to speculate on the basis of our own adult values. For example, Jodie could
equally well say to her identical and attached twin
that “I love you as myself and will do everything, including sacrificing my life, to keep you alive as long
as possible.” Likewise, Mary might reasonably say to
Jodie, “You are my identical twin, and because I love
you, I’m willing to die so that you can live, since this
is the only chance for my genes to be transmitted to
the next generation.” Each twin might also, of course,
consider the other twin to be an integral part of herself, a view that would preclude separation. Any of
these hypotheses is plausible, but made-up monologues cannot take the place of legal analysis.
Problems with Analogies

Justice Brooke’s opinion is problematic because in
my view he has not properly interpreted the analogies he uses. His reliance on the necessity defense, for
example, is ultimately based almost exclusively on the
two analogies that were reportedly used by a rabbi
in counseling a Philadelphia couple in a similar situation in 1977: the men jumping from the burning
plane and the caravan surrounded by bandits. In each
case, the necessity defense is said to be appropriate
because the person killed was “designated for death,”
a phrase Brooke adopts as his primary justification
for killing Mary to save Jodie. In fact, he goes further, concluding, “Mary is, sadly, self-designated for
a very early death.”
There are two problems with this conclusion.
First, Mary did not designate herself for anything,
she was simply born and survived. But even the simple conclusion that one can be “designated for death”
may not be a proper interpretation of the two analogies. The description of the cases was drawn from
an article I wrote in 1987, and I used a 1977 newspaper report as my own source.8,16,17 More important
than what might have been lost in the retelling, how-

ever, is that expert commentary on these examples
has since been published, and the court seems unaware of it.
A leading U.S. rabbinical authority, Rabbi J. David Bleich, has written that these two stories are not
examples of instances in which a person is “designated for death.”18 Instead, the example involving the
parachutists is more correctly thought of as a case of
pursuit, in which the first man’s kicking off of the
man who is clinging to him is justified by the fact
that that man’s intentional actions would otherwise
kill him. With respect to the second example, Rabbi
Bleich argues that the caravan is justified in turning
over the named person only if that person is guilty
of some crime; if the person is innocent, he may not
be given up to face certain death. Others have suggested that in a similar situation the group could
lawfully agree to use a random device, such as drawing straws, to decide who would be sacrificed for the
good of the group.19,20
Rabbi Bleich does, nonetheless, offer Lord Justice
Brooke another justification for his conclusions. Bleich
believes that there may be exceptional circumstances
in which one conjoined twin can be judged a pursuer of the other: “If the heart can be shown to belong to one twin exclusively, the second is, in effect,
a parasite . . . [and having] no claim to the heart,
is then quite literally a pursuer.”18 Pursuers must be
stopped before they kill, and self-defense would have
provided Brooke with a much sounder rationale than
the “designated for death” approach.
Problems with Conjoined Twins Themselves

Lord Justice Walker’s opinion is, I think, most notable in attempting to consider the conjoined twins
as both a single entity and two persons. Walker wants
to discourage the use of terms such as “monster” (and
probably “creature” as well) to describe conjoined
twins. Nonetheless, he speaks of them not as one entity, but as two separate “innocent children” and believes the “court must consider the welfare of each.”
The problem is that once the twins are separated verbally, it is only a matter of time before they will be
separated surgically. Walker sees these conjoined twins
as a serious, lethal anomaly that must be medically
corrected so that at least one of the twins can appear
normal. In this regard Walker seems correct in concluding, “in truth there is no helpful analogy or parallel to the current situation.” He thus seems to find
the condition of being a conjoined twin, at least when
one could live if the other were killed, itself adequate
justification for separation. That is why he can conclude, with the physicians, the trial-court judge, and
Lord Justice Brooke, that separation would be in the
best interests of both children. Stated another way,
three of the four judges believed that Mary was better off dead than continuing to live for a few months
as a conjoined twin.
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LESSONS

Perhaps the most important lesson of the case of
Jodie and Mary is that there are severe limits to the
law in making unprecedented, complex, life-and-death
decisions. The most important shortcoming of the
decision of the judges is that it did not rest on any
legal principle. That is why if the circumstances of
this case were to be duplicated tomorrow at the Great
Ormond Street Hospital for Children in London, the
physicians involved could, on the basis of the reasoning of this case (and contrary to its conclusion), decide to follow the wishes of the parents and let both
twins die. The conclusion of Lord Justice Ward that
it would have been “perfectly acceptable” for physicians to decide either way must be wrong: if Mary is
a pursuer who is killing Jodie, saving Jodie’s life (and
that of others in her situation) by ending Mary’s life
must be mandatory. The court’s ruling that physicians
can do whatever they think is best (with the court’s
prior approval) is no legal rule at all. Nor is it true
that there will almost always be ample time to seek
court review in cases such as this.10,21
Closely related is the question of the court’s role
in similar cases. Is it to determine whether a particular course of action, chosen by both parent and
physician, is legally permissible, or is it to determine
whether a particular medical intervention is required
by law? The first role seems reasonable; the second
seems justified only in cases in which the failure to
act (on the part of either parent or physician) is child
neglect. In this regard, had Jodie been a singleton,
her parents might well have been justified in refusing
to consent to three or four years of complicated surgical procedures with an uncertain outcome on the
basis that they did not believe the burdens of these
interventions on Jodie could be justified by the expected outcome even if the physicians believed the operation was in her best interest.22
My own view is that in this case, it would have
been better had the physicians not sought court intervention, or if they had, for the trial court to have
refused to hear the case and to have instructed the
physicians that they must obtain the parents’ consent

before separating the twins. I would have liked to have
had the parents agree to the separation (since giving
Jodie a chance to live at the cost of cutting Mary’s
life short does seem the lesser of two evils), but I do
not believe the case for separation is so strong that it
demands that the authority to make the decision about
the medical care of their children be taken away from
the parents.
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